By Hilarie Henry, Staff Writer
Was Canada giving
Iran’s Canadian embassy the pink-slip and pulling the plug on its own Tehran
embassy a smart move? CUSLI-Nexus staff
writer Hilarie Henry explores how Canada’s diplomatic severing with Iran
follows Canadian counter-terrorism strategy, didn’t cost Canada much, and may
just be a template for other nations to encourage Iran to change course when it
comes to its suspected terrorism ties and alleged desire to produce nuclear
weapons.
On Friday, September 7, Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister,
John Baird, announced
that Canada closed its embassy in Tehran and had given Iranian diplomats in
Canada five days to leave. Canada also listed
Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, allowing Canadians
affected by Iran-supported terrorism to sue for damages. In doing so, Baird claimed that Iran is the
world’s “most
significant threat to global peace and security.” In addition, he listed a slew of reasons for
the closings. Among
these reasons included Iran’s: (a) lack of safety concerns for Canada’s
diplomats, epitomized during an attack last November by a crowd on the British
Embassy in Tehran; (b) “blatant disregard for the Vienna Convention and its
guarantee of protection for diplomatic personnel;” (c) providing arms to the
Assad regime in Syria; (d) assistance to terrorist groups; (e) noncompliance
with United Nations resolutions concerning its nuclear program; (f) appalling
human rights record; (g) and threatening behavior towards Israel, such as
engaging in racist anti-Semitic rhetoric and inciting genocide. This entry will examine whether the embassy
closings were in line with Canada’s newly adopted counter-terrorism strategies.
Overall, Canada’s counter-terrorism approach has focused on
risk pre-emption by “allowing
risks to be dealt with on . . . an a priori (deterrence) basis rather than . .
. a post facto (firefighting) basis.”
On April 27, 2004, Canada adopted a new anti-terrorism strategy with its
Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National
Security Policy. This policy
places an emphasis on “public
safety,” in order to de-politicize its anti-terrorism efforts. Under the “International Security” heading,
the Policy states
that, “Canada will continue to play an important role in countering
international terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and defusing key intra- and interstate conflicts.” In addition, Canada’s International Policy
Statement (April 2005) helped to further criminalize and de-politicize Canada’s
anti-terrorism efforts by emphasizing that “within
the broader context of the Government’s counterterrorism strategy, Foreign
Affairs makes a unique contribution.”
Then on February 9, 2012, Canada launched
its Building Resilience Against Terrorism:
Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
This Strategy’s aim is “to counter
domestic and international terrorism in order to protect Canada, Canadians and
Canadian interests” through four mutually reinforcing elements: prevention,
detection, denials, and responding. Prevention
focuses on the “factors . . . motivat[ing] individuals to engage in terrorist
activities.” Detection
emphasizes the identification of terrorists and their plans through
intelligence operations and possessing a “solid understanding of the changing
threat environment.” Canada’s goal is to
deny
terrorists any opportunities by fixing areas of vulnerability and “aggressively
intervening in terrorist plan[s] . . . making Canadian interests a more
difficult target for would-be terrorists.”
Lastly, in the event of a terrorist attack, Canada wants to have a rapid
and organized response
that will reduce the effects of such an attack.
Canada now finds taking a firm stance against terrorism and
nuclear weapons so serious that it is willing to risk the following
consequences. In particular, by severing
all diplomatic ties with Iran, Canada will find it difficult to gather
intelligence and monitor Iran’s increased uranium production. Yet some argue that the closure will not make
much of a difference in these areas. They assert that Canada’s embassy was
already understaffed at eight people. Therefore, the embassy already could only
provide consular support, little effective
diplomacy, and minimal intelligence gathering. While this might be true, it is hard to argue
that a small embassy is worse than no embassy at all. Doug Saunders, Chief of the London-Based
European Bureau of the Globe and Mail explained
that, “Closing an embassy is rarely done even in moments of hostility. By its very nature it prevents the
possibility of further relations with the country in question, good or bad,
influential or ineffective . . . once you’ve pulled the plug, you’re out of the
game.” Whereas, Munk School of Global
Affairs director Janice Stein supports
“Canada’s firm stand against Iran,” arguing that “as this crisis [between
Canada and Iran] deepens and as time begins to move on the nuclear clock,
signaling intentions very clearly and firmly at this point is . . . a good
strategy.”
Another cost of the embassy closure Canada seems prepared to
endure in order to prevent terrorist attacks on Canadian interests, is the
abandonment of its citizens in Iran. Namely,
many Canadians are currently caught up in the Iranian justice system, three
of whom are currently on death row. These people have been directed
to contact the embassy in Ankara, Turkey.
The embassy closure will inevitably cause hardships for Canadian
citizens in Iran.
While Canada could have criticized Iran through other means,
like
the UN, summit meetings, or bilateral relations, one cannot argue that
Canada acted consistently with its terrorism policies. The closing of the
Canadian embassy in Iran delivers a strong message of disapproval toward states
aiding terrorists and constructing nuclear weapons against UN
stipulations. Thus, Canada’s decision is
in line with the National Security Policy
and Building Resilience Against Terrorism
Counter-Terrorism Strategy. With the
deteriorating relationship between Canada and Iran, and Iran’s
lack of safety measures for embassy personnel, Canada’s decision to close
up shop is a pre-emptive act to stave off risks to its civilian embassy
employees. This adeptly follows Canada’s
“public safety” and pre-emptive counter-terrorism strategy, placing it ahead of
the curve, rather than being forced to respond to an attack against its
diplomats after the fact.
Canada’s demonstrated willingness to aggressively crack down
on those supporting terrorism through its foreign affairs channels by closing
the two embassies has given muscle to its counter-terrorism strategy. Doing so conveys in concrete terms that, “building
resilience against terrorism is a priority for [Canada’s] government.” On a larger scheme, if other states follow in
Canada’s diplomatic/counter-terrorism footsteps, perhaps
Iran will be forced to deter from its alleged terrorist-supporting and nuclear bomb-building ways.
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