Showing posts with label debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label debt. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 16, 2012

Is Income-Based Repayment Obama's Stand-In for a Student Loan Bail Out? And Is it Smart Policy?

By Keith Edmund White
Editor-in Chief

Last week, CUSLI-Nexus Senior Editor Justin McNeil explored the provocative differences between the discharge of student loan debt in Canada and the United States. But is the White House using Income-Based Repayment as a stand in for bailing out those burdened with student loan debt?

Today the New America Foundation releases Safety Net or Windfall?, a report looking at soon-to-be finalized regulatory changes to 2010 legislation that reformed the Income-Based Repayment plan for federal student loans. 


The attention-getting talking point:
But contrary to benefitting [sic] low-income borrowers, the pending changes to IBR will actually provide generous benefits to borrowers with higher federal loan balances – those with graduate or professional degrees. A borrower with an MBA or a law degree can easily have a six-figure loan balance forgiven, even if his income exceeds $100,000 for much of his repayment term. 
And let’s not forget the U.S. fiscal backdrop all U.S. domestic spending (or in this case, forgiveness of federally issued debt) faces: With U.S. law-makers facing a fiscal crisis, any changes to student-loan repayment plans—especially those made in the executive branch via regulation—can’t be considered permanent.

So this brings us back to Justin’s piece:  Should U.S. law-makers, at the very least, revisit the legal rules for students looking to discharge their student debt?


Finally, here's a July 2011 article (updated in Sept. 2012) from The Globe and Mail about Canada's  growing difficulties with student debt.

Thursday, October 11, 2012

Should the U.S. Consider Emulating Canada’s Less Harsh Treatment of Student Loan Debt in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases?


By Justin McNeil, Senior Editor

CC-BY-SA 2009 Sagie/n0nick, http://www.flickr.com/photos/n0thing/3775488150/
Concerns over the total student loan debt in the United States, which recently hit the $1 trillion mark, continue to grow amidst projections that this is the next bubble to burst in the U.S. economy, possibly derailing a still weak recovery from the 2008 financial crisis.  But Ben Bernanke, the U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman, sees no such problems with student loans.  He points to the U.S. government’s ownership of nearly 85 percent of those loans, with the remaining 15 percent belonging to private lenders, as proof of their future stability. 

Unfortunately, Bernanke may be underestimating the dangers of having an economy with $1 trillion in student loan debt and unable to provide opportunities to graduates for full-time work.  Tie this to ballooning tuition costs and a U.S. legal system that makes it incredibly onerous for students to discharge their debt, and suddenly America’s student loan system changes from one offering a “ladder of opportunity” to one promising long-term financial dead weight.  This not only harms today’s graduates, it also puts America’s future economic growth at risk.   

Part of dealing with (or better yet preventing) a student loan bubble burst is to have a workable and fair approach to discharging student loans in bankruptcy.  Yes, this is a large, multifaceted topic, and this post will not delve deeply into the legal theories behind bankruptcy or why we treat educational debt differently than others.  But U.S. policy makers have an obvious starting point: Canada’s far more balanced legal approach to addressing the discharge of education debt in bankruptcy.

The American Approach

In the U.S., the current bankruptcy laws are very clear when it comes to student loan debt: there is no discharge of such debt through bankruptcy proceedings unless a showing of undue hardship can be made.  (See 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act).  In theory, such a limitation sounds reasonable to deter frivolous claims, but in practice the language essentially denies relief to all but a handful of the most financially strapped individuals.  While “undue hardship” is not defined in the statute, a definitive three-prong test was crafted in Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp. There, the court determined that prospective student bankrupts must establish:

(1)   that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans;
(2)   that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and
(3)   that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.

The use of vague, qualifying language including: minimal standard of living, likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period, and good faith efforts, has helped set an impossibly high hurdle for any American hoping to shed student loan debt through bankruptcy.  As an example, the standard was actually met recently when a former law student showed that her diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome prevented her from obtaining meaningful employment to repay her $339,361 of student loan debt.  Without such extreme circumstances though, U.S. bankruptcy courts rarely allow for a discharge.  What’s more egregious is that in the rare instance that this type of discharge is granted, the debtor immediately owes the IRS, and possibly others, for taxes on Cancellation of Debt Income.

The Canadian Model

In Canada, the process for gaining relief from student loans through bankruptcy, as set forth in § 178 of the Canada Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, is more forgiving to debtors.  The Canadian Student Loan Bankruptcy Blog conveniently distills the statutory requirements north of the border and explains how cases have normally proceeded, while also tracking proposed legislation in this area.  Essentially, a debtor may enter bankruptcy to fully discharge student loan debt 7 years after she was last enrolled as a student and the loans may then be automatically discharged.  The Canadian government or a private creditor can challenge the discharge though (even if 7 years have passed since the debtor was a student), which then requires the debtor to meet the requirements of a two-part test consisting of: 1) whether the debtor has shown good faith with their actions toward the student loans; and 2) whether the debtor will experience financial difficulty if forced to repay the loans. 

The court in the Ontario bankruptcy case of Giera (Re) set forth four factors to determine whether a debtor has acted in good faith:

[1] whether the money was used for the purpose loaned and if the education was completed, [2] whether the Bankrupt is deriving economic benefit from the education, [3] whether there were any reasonable efforts to repay the loans and [4] whether there was any effort by the Bankrupt to take advantage of interest relief or remission options offered by the lenders

Whether a bankrupt will experience financial difficulty in repaying the loans is determined through the court examining the debtor’s income, assets, and expenses to gauge the potential that the obligations can be met.  The court will also look to how much effort the debtor has put towards finding employment, if she is unemployed or underemployed.  Additionally, there is a special hardship provision through which a former student can apply for a loan discharge after only 5 years, but will have to immediately satisfy the same two-part test as above.   

In the last 20 years, the U.S. has systematically toughened its laws on discharging student loan debt to coincide with the increasing prevalence of student loans.  Before 1998, dischargeability in this area was not always based on the undue hardship standard and the process more closely resembled Canada’s, with the possibility of discharge available 5 years after ceasing to be a student.  Similarly, even private student loans remained dischargeable according to a lesser standard until the 2005 legislation mentioned above was passed to curb a perceived widespread abuse of the bankruptcy process.  Though student debtors have lately been subject to more restrictions in all of the Western common law jurisdictions, Canada has on balance seemed more sympathetic to student debtors than the U.S.  Furthermore, Canadian legislation continues to point in the more positive direction of lessening the burden of proof for prospective bankrupts.  See the recommendations in the Final Report of the Personal Insolvency Task Force.

Aggravating Factors

The astronomical rise of college tuition, and the overall economic climate mean that the U.S. may be forced to reexamine its policy toward student loan debt when it comes to bankruptcy in the near future.  Traditionally at common law, the bankruptcy process was a means through which a creditor was able to exercise his rights, with possible results being that debtors could be imprisoned or hanged.  But the modern conception of bankruptcy does not contemplate criminal punishment and seeks to balance creditor’s rights against debtor’s rights in a more equal fashion than was originally conceived.  Western common law jurisdictions have recognized that to better foster an entrepreneurial environment, a fresh start must be available for debtors whose economic ventures don’t always succeed.  Shouldn’t students be afforded the same relief? And what future costs will the American economy pay if students don’t get relief?

As of now, college tuition remains substantially lower in Canada than in the U.S.  And though recent efforts from the Obama administration have made the student loan repayment process more manageable, a confluence of factors mean that this may not be enough.  First, the President has made it a primary goal to further increase the availability of student loans to ensure greater access to higher education for Americans who may not be otherwise able to afford the costs of a college education.  Second, the federal government has now taken over the administration of student loans.  Though it backed many of these loans previously, it now has even more at stake when enforcing repayment and cannot afford mass defaults.  Finally, the economic downturn has magnified the difficulties that former students face in paying back their loans; without some further action to mitigate current circumstances, defaults are likely to increase in short order.

Conclusion

Considering how many talking points during the U.S. Presidential election have revolved around job creation, small business owners, entrepreneurship, and consumer spending, the increasing student debt should be getting more attention than it is.  There have been some commendable efforts to address this issue: the Student Loan Forgiveness Act proposed in the House of Representatives earlier this year.  However, a comprehensive reconsideration of American bankruptcy policy and, more specifically, easing the path to dischargeability of student loans may be necessary very soon.  A good place to start would be with Canada’s current policy.

Friday, September 7, 2012

China's "Mother of All Debt Bombs": Financial Time Bomb or Manageable Malady?


By Keith Edmund White
Editor-in-Chief

Today's Diplomat features Minxin Pei's alarming article over a suspected debt bomb lurching in China.  To keep the Chinese economy humming during the 2008 economic crisis, China had their own stimulus plan--one that relied heavily (~60%) on making it easier for local governments to borrow money.  So what's the worry today?  Massive local government infrastructure projects are likely to have a loan bounce rate of 10-20% (~$2 trillion give or take .4 trillion).  Along with a shadow banking system that is probably hiding the extent of its own bad loans, China may just be hiding "the mother of all debt bombs."  But is this bad, or just a correction that can be managed--and is actually a good thing?  Well, there's no consensus--but, one thing's for sure:  we all need to be watching China.

Watch out--China's banking system might be a ticking time bomb.  And if there is a financial crash in China, it's clear that it will be the defining economic development of 2013--and have a impact on the recovering American economy and softening Canadian economy.

From Minxin Pei's article, Are Chinese Banks Hiding "The Mother of All Debt Bombs"?:  [Note:  Pei's answer--yes.]

Flooding the economy with trillions of yuan in new loans did accomplish the principal objective of the Chinese government — maintaining high economic growth in the midst of a global recession.  While Beijing earned plaudits around the world for its decisiveness and economic success, excessive loose credit was fueling a property bubble, funding the profligacy of state-owned enterprises, and underwriting ill-conceived infrastructure investments by local governments.  The result was predictable: years of painstaking efforts to strengthen the Chinese banking system were undone by a spate of careless lending as new bad loans began to build up inside the financial sector.

To get a sense of China's debt problem, visuals can help:
The first graph compares China debt to GDP to Japan's debt to GDP 1988 by sector.  The second graph shows the growing wave of dark blue (loan growth) and the failure of this to correspond to a growth in money supply.  What does this suggest?  That even though there's a lot of cheap money in the Chinese economy, a lot of this is being eaten up by bad investments.  
Pei, a Calremont KcKenna Collegee Professor and Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, offers concise but thorough review of the economic weaknesses that the cheap-money approach has left China with.  I offer the following as an even more boiled down summary, weaving in Pei's analysis:

(1) Local government financing vehicles (LGFV)--financial entities created by local governments to encourage investment in infrastructure projects--owed 9.7 - 14.4 trillion yuan (~$1.5 trillion - $2.26 trillion) in 2010.  The problem:  "Chinese LGFVs are known mainly for their unique ability to sink perfectly good money into bottomless holes in the ground.  So taking on a huge mountain of debt can mean only one thing -- a future wave of default when the projects into which LGFVs have piled funds fail to yield viable returns to service debt."  The result:  Chinese banks may have to "write down 2 to 2.8 trillion yuan, a move sure to destroy their balance sheets."

(2) Biggest worry:  China's wealth management products, or WMPs.  Think of WMPs' effect on China's economy like derivatives effect on the U.S. economy in 2008.  In the U.S., then-newly created financial instruments called derivatives--which were tools that let people bet on an investment (you could 'hedge' your investment by finding someone to buy your bet against the investment).  The real problem, big firms over-leveraged in derivatives and didn't have the money to cover their bets when the economy soured--and, worse yet--financial assessments of firms did not consider this financial risk exposure when grading their credit-worthiness.

China has a similar problem.  Instead of derivatives, China has a shadow banking system, where--off the books--they provide loans to "private entrepreneurs and real estate developers denied access to the official banking system...."  Why are these attractive?  Because China controls returns from the official banking system.  The result, 11.5 percent of the total bank deposits are in "wealth management products" that invest in riskier/higher return investments.  Pei states that conservative estimates put 10% of these investments as utter flops, which means "another 1 trillion yuan in potential bank losses."

Why are analysts worried?  Chinese banks are now reporting "that non-performing loans are only 1 percent of total outstanding credit."  With the flood of cheap money and suspected 'true' amount of non-performing loans estimated as actually 10-20%, we are led to the most worrisome conclusion of Pei's piece:
"One thing is evident here.  Either we should not believe our "lying eyes" or Chinese banks are trying to hide the mother of all debt bombs.
(3)  The real estate market bubble:  47 business owners of real estate companies disappeared in 2011 to avoid repaying billions in bank loans.

(4)  Loans to Chinese manufacturers may not be paid back.  Chinese manufacturing firms (a) have slim profits even in good times and (b) make too much stuff.  The result?  A Chinese slow down will likely lead over-stocked manufacturers to flood the market, but still not able to pay back their loans.
Now, naturally, there's a quick rejoinder to these concerns:  Doesn't China have so much money, that it can easily write off $1-3 trillion in bad loans?  The Economist isn't worried, but others aren't so sure. 

Michael Pettis, a Senior Associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, isn't so sure:
Is Debt a Problem?

The rest of the [Economist] article argues in part that China can easily manage its debt problems because debt levels are actually relatively low and China has room to increase its net indebtedness:

China’s economy does need help, and its government has ample scope to provide it. Some local governments took on more debt than they could handle. But their liabilities never endangered the fiscal position of the country as a whole. The combined debts of China’s central and local governments add up to about 50% of the country’s GDP (including bonds issued by the Ministry of Railways and China’s policy banks, intended for state-directed lending). Even if local debts are understated, China has fiscal room for error.

I am not sure I agree. First, to make a minor point, I don’t think real estate has necessarily been the “biggest fear hanging over” China. I have always argued that the biggest worry is the unsustainable increase in debt, which historical precedents suggest is an almost automatic consequence of an aging investment-driven growth miracle. While the real estate bubble gets most of press, I would argue that several of the analysts who have been in the skeptic’s camp for many years, like Logan Wright of Medley Advisors or Victor Shih, now with Carlyle, usually agree that debt is the most worrying problem.

Of course borrowing money to fund a real estate bubble is an important source of bad debt, but I have argued for many years, and continue to believe, that economically non-viable infrastructure investment has been a much greater source of bad debt, by which I mean debt whose servicing cost (excluding of course interest rate repression) exceeds the debt servicing capacity created by the investment (excluding subsidies and including externalities). Empty buildings may be much easier to visualize, and much more photogenic, and many people still have an impossibly tough time understanding why it is possible to overinvest infrastructure (isn’t all infrastructure spending good?), but I would argue that sharply reducing infrastructure investment, or at least diverting it into more useful – if less glamorous – projects, is more important than reducing excess real estate development, although this too is clearly a problem.

But that aside, my disagreement with the article is really about whether or not China has a low enough debt level that we can relax about the “fiscal room for error.” Is the relevant debt really just 50% of GDP?
In sum:  China has a considerable debt problem.  Whether China can absorb this debt in a manageable fashion will be seen over the coming months.  In either case, pushing worries aside, readers should take solace:  We've found the one thing that bring the world's largest economies together--debt.


Want to learn more?

China's 'Little' Debt Problem, Business Insider, Sept. 5, 2010

China bank risks on the rise, analysts warn, Chris Oliver, MarketWatch, Sept. 7, 2012.

China's Local Debt Is No Problem, [Chinese Premier] Wen Says, Bloomberg Businessweek, March 14, 2012.

Despite Growth, China Too Faces Debt Problems, Frank Langfitt, NPR, Dec. 12, 2011.

How Will China Pay Off Its Debt?, Gordon G. Chang, Forbes, Feb. 26, 2012.