Let's Get Over "Net Benefit" Test Carping: Or Why Political Law is Still Law...and the World's Still Here

By Keith Edmund White, Editor-in-Chief

More complaining about the dreaded political nature of Canada's revamped "net benefit" test.  Critics seem to be saying, 'If a law's a law, it should always be transparent and consistent--just like jury decisions!'  Keith Edmund White looks at Don Lenihan's criticism of the Harper government new rules of foreign takeovers (i.e. the "net benefit" test), and stands up for the messy, status quo the revamped rules leave in place.  Added bonus:  mention of Conrad Black.

Don Lenihan, Vice President at Ottawa’s Public Policy Forum, hits the Harper government’s new rules on foreign takeovers of strategic Canadian industries (and compliments Conrad Black).
From Lenihan’s iPolitics article:

If we really are at the beginning of a long-term trend that will force the federal government to begin employing controversial (possibly highly controversial) measures to protect Canada’s strategic assets, the goal of the policy should be to ensure that the decisions are transparent, effective and fair.

Unfortunately, on this score the new rules raise more questions than they answer. Do we really want to include all SOEs under one catch-all rule? If an SOE is willing to comply with the same rules as private sector companies, should this make a difference?

If the policy allows “exceptional circumstances” to override the rules, how will these be defined? How will the government deal with future private sector cases that are similar to the Saskatchewan Potash Corp? What other resources or industries could be declared strategic assets?

What options are open to the government to create the kind of “middle ground solution” proposed by Black?

Lenihan echoes the worries of many commentators about Canada’s vague “net benefit” rules.  The tacit underlying assumption of Lenihan’s critique: all legal determinations should be consistent and transparent.  But aren’t foreign takeovers of critical Canadian industries (or of any nation) as political—as say—the political and inconsistent decisions to raise or lower taxes or conclude a foreign investment treaties?  And in the case of foreign takeovers, are any two Canadian industries really the same?

But what will keep Canada from deterring smart foreign investment?  Simple:  If Canada drives away smart investment, it will feel it where it counts--the pocket-book.

Sure, this approach may not have the gossamer shine (and superficiality) of administrative consistency, but there are legal issues that societies do not settle through bright-line rules. And those issues tend to be that way for a reason.

And Lenihan's critique--making a new sub-set of rules for SOEs that comply with private sector practices--shows just how illusory the quest for a Black-ian "net benefit" middle-ground is.  The more Canada tries to make rules for all possible foreign takeover scenarios, the longer the rule becomes, perhaps to the point of incomprehensibility--and the easier it is manipulated.  Just ask anti-Affordable Care advocates how they feel about the ACA being considered a 'tax' and not a 'mandate' by the controlling opinion of the Supreme Court, thereby passing U.S. constitutional muster.  The point:  rules don't always bring clarity, especially when they are voluminous and involve hot-button issues.  

Oh, and wait, we're worried, in the case of Chinese state-owned enterprise CNOOC takeover of Nexen,  of Canada's notoriously illiberal society negatively impacting the struggling, still-malleable but liberal-idolizing economy of China?   

Check out one notable exception to the chorus of "net benefit" naysayers, Jeffrey Simpson's article in last week's The Globe and Mail:

China [owner of Cnooc who put in the bid for Nexen] wants things both ways: that its SOEs can buy elsewhere but others can’t buy in China. That the Harper government has now identified a sector of the Canadian economy essentially off-limits to SOEs can’t logically be objected to by China, which puts big swaths of its economy out of reach of foreign investment or insists that foreign companies can only buy minority interests or participate in joint ventures.

China has been pursuing a policy of locking up natural resources wherever they can be profitably bought, and Canada seemed a likely next target. If China doesn’t like the new Canadian guidelines, there are plenty of other opportunities around the world. If China chooses not to test the guidelines, Alberta’s bitumen oil will still interest other investors.

The challenges of bitumen oil are so many that the new guidelines’ impact is among the least threatening. The changing oil scene in the United States, the difficulty of getting approval for pipelines, the growing emissions of greenhouse gases, the discount price for oil to the U.S. and high production costs are among the industry’s key challenges.

Mr. Harper, whose foreign policy is too often characterized by finger-waving intransigence, struck a reasonable balance in this instance between domestic interests and international concerns.

Is this the best system?  Probably not.

Is it a workable system for a sensitive topic in a democratic society?  Sure seems that way.

In any case, Lenihan should check out the Journal of Parliamentary and Political Law.

Also, to all readers, know that the world (and Canada) will survive the new "net benefit" test; just like the world (and Canada) survived the last one.

CNOOC’s Nexen Bid & “Net Benefit” Test: What the Legal Test Betrays About Canadian Politics and the Harper's Economic Agenda

By Eskor Edem, Staff Writer 

A Chinese state-owned company, CNOOC, wants to take a controlling interest in Canadian energy company Nexen. The hang-up? The bid must satisfy the “net benefit” requirement that Canadian law imposes on all foreign direct investments exceeding C$299 million. Critically, while the “net benefit” test is—on paper—a six-pronged legal test, a political figure—Minister of Industry and member of the Stephen Harper cabinet member Christian Paradis—applies the test. Thus, political, not the legal, factors will likely determine if CNOOC’s bid passes the net benefit test. CUSLI-Nexus staff writer Eskor Edem reviews the “net benefit” test, identifies the three political factors critical to Mr. Paradis’ decision, and concludes that CNOOC’s bid will likely pass the “net benefit” test. But that won't be the end of the story:  the CNOOC bid still has other administrative hurdles to clear.

“Net Benefit” Test

Although established as statutory law, the “net benefit” rule is really more a political test allowing the seating administration the block foreign investment injurious to its policy vision. Under the Investment Canada Act transactions are reviewable when they exceed the threshold of C$299 million. The final decision of whether a transaction is a “net benefit” is made by the Minister of Industry. As the Minister is an appointed political position, the economic policy of the governing party plays a prominent role in reaching an answer to the “net benefit” question. In determining whether foreign direct investment is a “net benefit”, the Minister of Industry considers a number of factors related the potential economic and cultural impact of the investment. The economic factors weighed range from the potential impact on domestic jobs, the participation of Canadians in the venture, and the impact on Canada’s global competitiveness. Cultural factors can be seen as a catch-all for a range of politically sensitive, non-economic topics—like a foreign investment’s impact on Canada’s indigenousness population, the First Nations. 

Lessons from Canada’s “Net Benefit” Rejection: BHP Billiton and Potash

In 2010, then Minister of Industry Tony Clement rejected BHP Billiton’s proposed hostile takeover of the Canadian mining company PotashCorp. The negative impact of BHP’s proposed takeover on Saskatchewan’s mining economy was the determinative factor in Minister Clement’s rejecting the bid on “net benefit” grounds. Saskatchewan is home to 1/3 of the global potash market. Naturally, this means that the government derives significant revenues from potash mining companies—15% in 2008. But the province also plays a critical role in potash pricing: with a Canadian industry body, Canpotex, the sole distributor for Canadian potash that is marketed outside North America. Canpotex’s exclusive control over the marketing of Canadian potash provides price stability on which Saskatchewan can rely in estimating its future revenue stream. 

PotashCorp. made up 54% of Canoptex’s output at the time of BHP’s bid to acquire it. As such, BHP’s insistence that it would take PotashCorp. out of Canoptex would have dealt a significant, if not fatal blow, to Saskatchewan’s influence on the price of potash on the international market. Opening up Canada’s potash market posed a serious threat to the Canadian economy and, perhaps more importantly, Saskatchewan’s finances. A law firm advising the Province on the matter in Jan. 2011, Jones Day found: 

[T]here was a risk of significant job losses by other Canadian potash manufacturers as a result [of] BHP’s plans to run its Jansen mine “flat out” and its threatened departure from Canpotex… Saskatchewan could [have] los[t]up to CAN $6 billion in tax revenues if BHP operated PotashCorp mines at full capacity.

Independent marketing could have potentially resulted in the (1) the loss of price setting abilities which the province had enjoyed to date; (2) a significant decline in the potash prices largely due to BHP’s level of production; and (3) a significant decline in tax revenue. 

Given the high level of public disapproval of the takeover, approving BHP’s bid carried significant political down side for the Harper administration. On top of public disapproval, Conservative provincial officials voiced their avid resistance to the transaction. In making their case against BHP, provincial officials argued that an “increasingly strategic” resource required maintaining Saswatchan’s influence over global potash prices. According to some, approving BHP’s takeover held the potential of reducing Canada’s food and energy security.

The “Net Benefit” Test’s Political Factors and Why CNOOC Passes the Test

A decision in CNOOC’s favor would provide credibility to Prime Minister Harper’s policy of strengthening Canada’s economic ties with Asia. Minster Paradis’ final determination will be guided by Prime Minister Harper’s goal of ensuring Canadian natural gas and oil producers get access to China's growing energy appetite. As such, application of the “net benefit” rule to CNOOC will likely diverge from the strict letter of the law. In reaching his decision, Paradis will likely consider three political factors:  (1) the nature of the targeted company; (2) The level of provincial support for the CNOOC’s acquisition; and, (3) the possibility of greater market access for Canadian firms operating in China.

Unlike Potash, Nexen is not uniquely dominant in Canadian industry. Nexen only ranks as a middling player in Canada’s oil and gas sector. John Manley, a former Liberal Minister of Industry, made clear if a larger Canadian oil and gas company was at stake, the government would be likely to block a takeover bid on “net benefit” grounds, in this Bloomberg Sept. 2012 article:

‘[If Suncor were the target company]…you would have a different set of questions being asked, simply because of [Suncor’s] scale and…importance in the Canadian context,’…Suncor is Canada’s ‘biggest independent, and that puts it in a somewhat different category.’

CNOOC’s takeover of Nexen does not threaten Alberta’s finances. Unlike the Potash market, in which Canoptex plays a price setting function, factors inherent to the oil and gas markets prevent any single player from determining market prices. In the oil and gas market prices are largely set by supply and demand, with spontaneous political events playing an influential role in short-term price volatility. As such, Alberta does not have the ability to set the market price its oil and gas producers get for their output. Hence, in this regard CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen will not affect Alberta’s royalty stream; thus, CNOOC’s bid avoids a major point of contention in BHP’s bid.

Furthermore, unlike the Potash bid, the provincial government of Alberta supports CNOOC’s bid. During a recent interview, Alberta’s Premier Alison Redford spoke favorably of CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen, stating:

At the end of the day, our view is that if this is in Alberta’s interest, it should go ahead. And we think there’s a lot of benefit for Alberta and Canada in this deal.

And in discussing CNOOC’s bid, public commentators have stressed a potentially large up-side for Canada if the bid is approved: If Canada grants China market access within the energy sector, other Canadian companies may find it easier to get access to the burgeoning Chinese marketplace. As reported by the Wall Street Journal, DBRS debt rating agency has found:

‘This transaction would dramatically improve Canada-China relations, which could in turn provide greater economic trade between the two countries.’…add[ing] that approval could also open the door for Canadian businesses in China.

And, obviously, CNOOC’s Nexen bid would strengthen energy ties between China and Canada. Given Canada’s unease with the Obama administration’s reluctance to approve the Keystone XL project, laying the foundation for substantial growth in Sino-Canadian energy trade has become a major policy objective of the Harper administration.

Conclusion

The CNOOC bid, albeit not without some belly-aching, is very likely to pass Canada’s “net benefit” test. First, while superficially a 6-pronged legal test, the “net benefit” rule is really more a political test: giving the Canadian government a way to block foreign investment that may compromise core Canadian economic interests. And as BHP’s failed bid shows, the political variables at play are: (1) the size and scope of the targeted Canadian company, (2) support on the provincial level for the acquisition, and (3) the economic rewards of approving the bid. With Nexen a relatively small player in the Canadian oil and gas industry, Alberta’s support of CNOOC’s bid, and the Harper government’s eagerness to open up the lucrative Chinese marketplace to Canadian firms, CNOOC’s bid for Nexen is very likely to clear the “net benefit” hurdle.