Wednesday, November 14, 2012

Canada’s Severing Ties with Iran: A Counter-Terrorism Maneuver?


By Hilarie Henry, Staff Writer

Was Canada giving Iran’s Canadian embassy the pink-slip and pulling the plug on its own Tehran embassy a smart move?  CUSLI-Nexus staff writer Hilarie Henry explores how Canada’s diplomatic severing with Iran follows Canadian counter-terrorism strategy, didn’t cost Canada much, and may just be a template for other nations to encourage Iran to change course when it comes to its suspected terrorism ties and alleged desire to produce nuclear weapons. 

On Friday, September 7, Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister, John Baird, announced that Canada closed its embassy in Tehran and had given Iranian diplomats in Canada five days to leave.  Canada also listed Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, allowing Canadians affected by Iran-supported terrorism to sue for damages.  In doing so, Baird claimed that Iran is the world’s “most significant threat to global peace and security.”  In addition, he listed a slew of reasons for the closings.  Among these reasons included Iran’s: (a) lack of safety concerns for Canada’s diplomats, epitomized during an attack last November by a crowd on the British Embassy in Tehran; (b) “blatant disregard for the Vienna Convention and its guarantee of protection for diplomatic personnel;” (c) providing arms to the Assad regime in Syria; (d) assistance to terrorist groups; (e) noncompliance with United Nations resolutions concerning its nuclear program; (f) appalling human rights record; (g) and threatening behavior towards Israel, such as engaging in racist anti-Semitic rhetoric and inciting genocide.  This entry will examine whether the embassy closings were in line with Canada’s newly adopted counter-terrorism strategies. 

Overall, Canada’s counter-terrorism approach has focused on risk pre-emption by “allowing risks to be dealt with on . . . an a priori (deterrence) basis rather than . . . a post facto (firefighting) basis.”  On April 27, 2004, Canada adopted a new anti-terrorism strategy with its Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy.  This policy places an emphasis on “public safety,” in order to de-politicize its anti-terrorism efforts.  Under the “International Security” heading, the Policy states that, “Canada will continue to play an important role in countering international terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and defusing key intra- and interstate conflicts.”  In addition, Canada’s International Policy Statement (April 2005) helped to further criminalize and de-politicize Canada’s anti-terrorism efforts by emphasizing that “within the broader context of the Government’s counterterrorism strategy, Foreign Affairs makes a unique contribution.” 

Then on February 9, 2012, Canada launched its Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy.  This Strategy’s aim is “to counter domestic and international terrorism in order to protect Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests” through four mutually reinforcing elements: prevention, detection, denials, and responding.  Prevention focuses on the “factors . . . motivat[ing] individuals to engage in terrorist activities.”  Detection emphasizes the identification of terrorists and their plans through intelligence operations and possessing a “solid understanding of the changing threat environment.”  Canada’s goal is to deny terrorists any opportunities by fixing areas of vulnerability and “aggressively intervening in terrorist plan[s] . . . making Canadian interests a more difficult target for would-be terrorists.”  Lastly, in the event of a terrorist attack, Canada wants to have a rapid and organized response that will reduce the effects of such an attack.

Canada now finds taking a firm stance against terrorism and nuclear weapons so serious that it is willing to risk the following consequences.  In particular, by severing all diplomatic ties with Iran, Canada will find it difficult to gather intelligence and monitor Iran’s increased uranium production.  Yet some argue that the closure will not make much of a difference in these areas. They assert that Canada’s embassy was already understaffed at eight people. Therefore, the embassy already could only provide consular support, little effective diplomacy, and minimal intelligence gathering.  While this might be true, it is hard to argue that a small embassy is worse than no embassy at all.  Doug Saunders, Chief of the London-Based European Bureau of the Globe and Mail explained that, “Closing an embassy is rarely done even in moments of hostility.  By its very nature it prevents the possibility of further relations with the country in question, good or bad, influential or ineffective . . . once you’ve pulled the plug, you’re out of the game.”  Whereas, Munk School of Global Affairs director Janice Stein supports “Canada’s firm stand against Iran,” arguing that “as this crisis [between Canada and Iran] deepens and as time begins to move on the nuclear clock, signaling intentions very clearly and firmly at this point is . . . a good strategy.” 

Another cost of the embassy closure Canada seems prepared to endure in order to prevent terrorist attacks on Canadian interests, is the abandonment of its citizens in Iran.  Namely, many Canadians are currently caught up in the Iranian justice system, three of whom are currently on death row.  These people have been directed to contact the embassy in Ankara, Turkey.  The embassy closure will inevitably cause hardships for Canadian citizens in Iran.

While Canada could have criticized Iran through other means, like the UN, summit meetings, or bilateral relations, one cannot argue that Canada acted consistently with its terrorism policies. The closing of the Canadian embassy in Iran delivers a strong message of disapproval toward states aiding terrorists and constructing nuclear weapons against UN stipulations.  Thus, Canada’s decision is in line with the National Security Policy and Building Resilience Against Terrorism Counter-Terrorism Strategy.  With the deteriorating relationship between Canada and Iran, and Iran’s lack of safety measures for embassy personnel, Canada’s decision to close up shop is a pre-emptive act to stave off risks to its civilian embassy employees.  This adeptly follows Canada’s “public safety” and pre-emptive counter-terrorism strategy, placing it ahead of the curve, rather than being forced to respond to an attack against its diplomats after the fact.

Canada’s demonstrated willingness to aggressively crack down on those supporting terrorism through its foreign affairs channels by closing the two embassies has given muscle to its counter-terrorism strategy.  Doing so conveys in concrete terms that, “building resilience against terrorism is a priority for [Canada’s] government.”  On a larger scheme, if other states follow in Canada’s diplomatic/counter-terrorism footsteps, perhaps Iran will be forced to deter from its alleged terrorist-supporting and nuclear bomb-building ways.

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